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Purpose: An electronic product recycling not only needs the waste treatment company, but
also involves recycler and remanufacturer. It is significance for increasing subsidy modes and
promoting waste recycling to research the effect of  government subsidies for recycler and
remanufacturer on the equilibrium of  closed-loop supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach: In view of  service competition, we build a Stackelberg
model which contains an original manufacturer, a recycler and remanufacturer and further
obtain the equilibrium decision of  closed-loop supply chain. Based on this strategy model, we
analyze how two different subsidies to utilization rate of  raw materials, the service level and the
demand of  product affect on the terminal decision. 
Findings: We compared the two different subsidy ways in closed-loop supply chain. Subsidy to
utilization rate of  raw materials has no effect on the whole market demand for electronic
product; and subsidy on utilization rate of  raw materials has no effect on the whole market
demand for electronic product.
Research implications: Under the conditions in which government can observe the
information of  raw material utility and remanufacturing service level, if  government decides to
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expand the market size, it could subsidize remanufacturer for different service level; Under the
conditions in which government can observe the information of  raw material utility and
remanufacturing service level, if  government want to improve utilization rate of  raw materials,
stimulate sustainable development of  industries of  electronic product, it can subsidizes recycler
based on different utilization rate of  raw materials.
Originality/value: We analyzed the closed-loop supply chain equilibrium, compared the
effects on it under different subsidy mechanism and offered some advises in order to provide
scientific support to promote electronic products recycling.
Keywords: subsidy, service, closed-loop supply chain, utilization rate of  raw materials, decision-making
1. Introduction
In the Provisions on the Collection and Management of Funds for the Disposal of
WasteElectrical and Electronic Products issued in 2012, the twentieth clause refers to setting
quotas on subsidies to the company according to the quantity ofWaste Electrical and Electronic
Products treatment, which indicates that the subsidies is very important for these companies.
Because Electronic products recycling not only needs the waste treatment company, but also
involves recycler and remanufacturer, so it is significance for increasing subsidy modes and
promoting waste recycling to research the effect of government subsidies for recycler and
remanufacturer on the equilibrium of closed-loop supply chain.
Two aspects of research have been done on the waste electronic products in the closed loop
supply chain; one is about the Electronic products recycling policy, for example, Boks, Nilsson
and Masui (1998) have described the collection, dismantling and disposal process of waste
electrical and electronic product in West Europe, Japan and US and compared laws and
regulations on recycling, landfill and incineration, payment, responsibility, division of recycling
among different countries. Nagel, Nilsson and Boks (1999) introduced policies used to
construct recycling system of waste electrical and electronic product in Germany, Dutch and
Switzerland and summarized recycling cost of various electrical apparatus under different
system in different countries. Stevels (2001) researched structure, principles and charging
mode of management organization of waste electronic product - NVMP in Dutch. Since Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive, WEEE Directive has been issued by EU in Feb.
13, 2003, the study on policy of the waste electronic product treatment gradually reduce, then
Scott and Supriya constructed the model of a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain based on
the EU recycling law of waste electrical and electronic product, and they discussed the impact
of competitive strategy and recycling policy on remanufacturing and studied effect of recycling
subsidy and government recycling on remanufacturing competitive. The other aspect about
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optimal decision in remanufacturing of waste electronic increased. Ferguson and Toktay
analyzed competition between origin manufacturer and remanufacturer, critical condition under
which manufacturer decides to remanufacture or not, profit loss and manufacturer entries
strategy based on duopoly (Ferguson & Toktay, 2006). Wang Wenbing etc. studied design of
incentive mechanism guided by government in the Electronic products reverse supply chain.
They come to the conclusion that government incentive mechanism accelerate recycling rate
(Wen-bin & Qing-li, 2010). Ji Guojun etc. explored decision-making problem of the
remanufacturing supply chain under the recycling regulations constrains (Ji & Huang, 2010) .
Xiong Zhongkai investigates coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain under patent
protection (Xiong, Shen & Peng, 2011). Wang Wenbing and Da Liqing using recycler profit
function studied collection and pricing in closed-loop chain when retailer and the third party
are responsible for collection (Wang & Da, 2010). Li Feng has researched the pricing model
and coordination of reverse supply chain in the case of imperfect information and got the
optimal pricing contract in which coordination has been achieved (Li, Sun & Da, 2009). Zhang
Xumei analyzed recycling benefits when manufacturer and recycler coordinate with each other
(Zhang & Huang, 2013). According to Atasu’s result, the value of remanufacturing product is
perceived lower than new product, two products possess different cost and services
competition in terms of remanufacturing and manufacturing process, hence, remanufacturer
needs to promote sales through their services (Atasu, Sarvary & Van Wassenhove, 2008).
Cheng-Han Wu studied all members’ decision-making problems in the two-echelon closed-loop
supple chain with pricing and services competition based on Stackelberg game model, and
creatively constructed profit model and so on (Wu, 2012).
With the rapid development of the third industry, services can be traded as an independent
product, as well as accessories of the visible product. Service plays a major role throughout all
industries (Chen, Liu & Yuan, 2010; Meng & Cai, 2009). In the closed-loop supply chain of
waste electronic product recycling, the service level of remanufacturing and new product
affects the whole market demand and chain decision making. The informed research
concentrated on the subsidy for the treatment quantity of the waste electronic product rather
than the service level and utilization rate of raw materials hasn’t been published. As the
development of information and data technology, the information becomes more transparent.
Since government can not only observe the price of remanufacturing electronic product, but
also the information about supply chain-decision making such as service level and utilization
rate of raw materials (Wu, 2012), the subsidy mechanism could be designed on the base of
service level and utilization rate of raw materials of remanufacturing product. In this study,
based on government subsidy according to decision-making variables of recycler and
remanufacturer including utilization rate of raw materials and service level, we have
constructed non coordination game model, analyzed the closed-loop supply chain equilibrium,
compared the effects on it under different subsidy mechanism and offered some advises in
order to provide scientific support to promote electronic products recycling.
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2. Model
Original manufacturer produce new product and remanufacturer produce remanufactured
product. Although these two products are functionally the same, consumer’s willing to pay is
different due to their different values. We suppose that recycler collect waste electronic
product, remanufacturer only produce remanufactured product and original manufacturer just
produce new product. Recycler determines optimal utilization rate of raw materials, original
determines servicers’ level of new product and remanufacturer decides service level of
remanufactured product.
Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: All chain members’ decisions must be prior to the selling season (Wu,
2012).
Hypothesis 2: Before the start of the selling season, the price and service information
for the products is announced to the market (Wu, 2012).
Hypothesis 3: All chain members are independent, risk-neutral and profit-maximizing
(Wu, 2012).
Hypothesis 4: The chain members choose their decisions sequentially in a Stackelberg
game.
Hypothesis 5: Both products price p decided by two manufacturers are constant.
Hypothesis 6: Let τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, be the recycler’s decision-making variable, which denote
utilization rate of raw materials. Obviously, recycling cost is increasing and
remanufacturing cost is decreasing in τ.
Hypothesis 7: there are two government subsidy mechanisms: one is subsidized for
utilization rate of raw materials and the other for remanufacturer service level.
In view of these hypothesizes, we define liner demand function of service level. Let subscript j
take the values of r and n, denoting the remanufactured and new product, respectively. Let sj
denote service level of manufacturer j, p denote two products the same price and αj describes
the market base parameterizing the potential market size for product j when price at zero and
no service is offered. We believe that βp and βS represent the prices and service elasticity,
respectively. Let dj denote the market demand for product j, j{r, n} We define the general
demand function that captures both product and service competition as follow:
dj = aj – βpp + βssj – γs (sk – sj); αj, βp, βs > 0; γs ≥ 0, j{r, n}, k = {r, n} \ j, 
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We denote that dj is upward sloping along its service and γs measures the service competition.
Heightening sj by one unit will attract γs + βs more customers with demand dj if other
parameters are equal.
The whole decision-making process is as follow: Recycler collects used product according to
remanufacturer demand, which means that the collection quantity is equal to demand for
remanufactured product. Remanufacturer pays ν for one unit waste electronic product to
recycler. The unit collection cost of waste product is . That is, the collection cost becomes
higher as τ increase. Because recycler is risk-neutral, he has no risk cost. The new product
manufacturer carries the production cost and service cost. The total production cost is cdn, and
the service cost is (msn2) / 2, where c being a unit of production cost and m is the ultimate cost
of service. The remanufacturer carries original raw material cost and remanufacturing cost for
unit remanufactured product, which are described as c(1-τ) and crτ respectively, where
τ(0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) can be considered the portion of recovered materials used to produce a unit product
by the manufacturer. v is the cost of unit recycling product.Assume the cost savings from
remanufacturing is a constant and let δ ≡ c – cr > 0. The unit remanufacturing cost with
returned items can be expressed as c(1-τ) + crτ = c - δτ (Wu, 2012).
3 Different Subsidies’ Impact on Equilibrium Decision-making of Closed-loop Supply
Chain
3.1 Equilibrium decision-making under subsidy to utilization rate of raw materials
If government subsidizes recycler according to utilization rate of raw materials, let Tt be
Subsidy coefficient, and the subsidy be τTt. Therefore, the recycling profit function is (Wu,
2012):
(1)
The original manufacturer profit function is (Wu, 2012):
(2)
There manufacturer profit function is (Wu, 2012).:
(3)
Now we examine chain members’ decision by maximizing their profits in (1)-(3)
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Proposition 1: When government subsidize for utilization rate of raw materials, the closed-
loop supply chain can reach equilibrium decisions τt*, snt* and srt*.
Focusing on the impact of service levels on the original manufacturer and remanufacturer
response functions, we derive the differential of  with respect to the service level, by
solving the first conditions , we obtain
(4)
Note that Λs ≡ βs + γs > 0 is the overall effect of the service on its demand.
In (4), we find that snb is independent of τ; so snt* = snb 
With the best response functions for service, and service level in (4), the remanufacturer’s
best response in terms of his utilization rate of raw materials can be obtained by solving
, i.e.,  which yields the equilibrium remanufacturing effort:
With , we can get equilibrium service levels snt* and srt* with γs ≠ 0 which
presents the presence of service competition.
(6)
With the first differential of equilibrium decision respect to Tt, we can obtain:
(7)
Proposition 1 is proved.
Conclusion 1: when subsidy coefficient increases one unit, recycling decision-making τt*,
increases  unit, remanufacturer equilibrium srt* increases  unit and the original
manufacturer snt* do not change.
-1066-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1149
From conclusion 1 we can see that subsidy for utilization rate of raw materials has positive
effect on the remanufacturing service level, and has no effect on manufacturing service level.
Proposition 2: when subsidies to utilization rate of raw materials, we can obtain optimal new
product demand dnt* and remanufactured product demand drt*
Applying equilibrium decision-making of all members in close-cycle supply to demand function,
it is easy to get that 
(8)
(9)
Then we derive the first differential of demand with respect to Tt, we can obtain:
(10)
Conclusion 2: when Tt increases one unit, new product demand dnt* will decrease  unit,
remanufactured product drt* demand will increases  unit.
With conclusion 2, we can show that the decreasing demand for new product is equal to
increasing demand for remanufactured product whether the Tt increases or decreases. That is,
the subsidy to utilization rate of raw materials has no effect on the whole market demand for
electronic product.
3.2. Subsidy to remanufacturing service level
When government subsidize in terms of remanufacturing service level, the recycling profit
function (Wu, 2012) is:
(11)
The original manufacturer profit function is (Wu, 2012):
(12)
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If government subsidizes recycler according to remanufacturing service level, set Tr be Subsidy
coefficient, and the subsidy is srTt. Therefore remanufacturer profit function (Wu, 2012) is:
(13)
Now we examine chain members’ decision by maximizing their profits in (11)-(13)
Proposition 3: When government subsidize based on remanufacturing service level, the
closed-loop supply chain can reach equilibrium decisions, τr*, srr* and snr*.
Focusing on the impact of service levels on the original manufacturer and remanufacturer
response functions, we derive the differential of  with respect to the service level, by
solving the first conditions , we obtain
(14)
Note that Λs ≡ βs + γs > 0 is the overall effect of the service on its demand.
In (14), we find that snb is independent of τ; so sn* = snb 
With the best response functions for service, and service level in (14), the remanufacturer’s
best response in terms of his utilization rate of raw materials can be obtained by solving
, i.e.,  which yields the equilibrium remanufacturing effort:
 (15)
With , we can derive equilibrium service levels sr*, sn* with γs ≠ 0 which presents the
presence of service competition:
(16)
Proposition 3 is proved.
Then we derive the first differential of equilibrium decision with respect to Tr, we can obtain:
(17)
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Conclusion 3: when subsidy coefficient increases one unit, remanufacturer equilibrium srr*
increases  unit, but recycling decision-making τr* and the original manufacturer snr* have not
been influenced. 
From conclusion 3, it is easy to see that remanufacturing service level has positive effect on
the remanufacturing service level, but has no effect on utilization rate of raw materials and
manufacturing service level.
Proposition 4: when subsidize according to remanufacturing service level, we can obtain
optimal new product demand dnr* and remanufactured product demand drr*
Using the same method as Proposition 2, we can see that
(18)
(19)
Proposition 4 is proved.
Then we derive the first differential of demand with respect to Tr, we can achieve the result
that 
(20)
Conclusion 4: when Tr increases one unit, new product demand dnr* will decrease  unit,
remanufactured product drr* demand will increases  unit.
From conclusion 4, we can show that the decreasing demand for new product is equal to
increasing demand for remanufactured product. Whether the Tt increases or decreases, we can
show that the subsidy on utilization rate of raw materials has no effect on the whole market
demand for electronic product.
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4. Numerical simulation
In order to research the influence of different subsidy mechanism on chain members
equilibrium decision-making directly, we turn to numerical analyses of above results. We define
subsidy to utilization rate of raw materials as mechanism A, and remanufacturing service level
as mechanism B for convenience.
A selected set of parameters is as follows: ar = an = 144, b = 60, m = 90, p = 3, c = 1.5, ν =
0.1, δ = 1, βp = 20, γs = 15, βs = 15
(1) based on mechanism A, we obtain: 
(2) based on mechanism B, we can obtain: 
When the equilibrium decision-making of A is subtracted by B, we can compare the utilization
rate of raw materials, service level and demand with figures of two different subsidy
mechanisms. 
As , materials’ utilization rate of A, τr* is larger than B. And, the distinction
between them increases Tt. But it is not influenced by Tr.
From Figure 1, we can see that when 2Tr = Tt, Δsr* = 0, which indicates that two service level
are equal under different mechanism. If 2Tr > Tt, Δsr* < 0， the remanufacturing service level of
A is higher than B and vice versa.
With Figure 2, it is shown that if 2Tr = Tt, Δdn* = 0, which indicates that when subsidy
coefficient of A is twice as much as B, two product demands are equal. If 2Tr > Tt, Δdn* > 0, and
vice versa.
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Figure 1. Influences of Tt and Tr on Δsr* 
Figure 2. Influences of Tt and Tr on Δdn*
Figure 3. Influences of Tt and Tr on Δdr*
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Noticing ，  we can get the result that if 20Tr – 10Tt = 377, Δdr* = 0. If
20Tr – 10Tt > 377, Δdr* < 0. If 20Tr – 10Tt < 377, Δdr* > 0. In Figure 3, We can observe that with
the distinction between twice subsidy coefficient of A and subsidy coefficient of B increasing,
first, demand for remanufactured product of A is lager than B, then two demand are the same
and finally B is larger than A.
5. Solutions and Advises
5.1. Expand the size of the market
When government subsidizes recycler, decreasing demand for new product is the same with
the increasing demand for remanufactured product, so the total demand do not change and
the size of market keep the same. In the view of economic benefits, demand for product,
consumption level of consumer and social utility level keep constant. Government will not
implement subsidy policy as a rational individual. When government subsidizes
remanufacturer, the decreasing demand for new product is smaller than increasing demand for
remanufactured product. So the total demand increases, the market size expand, consumption
level increases and the whole social utility increases which shows that government interferes
play a positive role. Therefore, under the conditions in which government can observe the
information of raw material utility and remanufacturing service level, if government decides to
expand the market size, it could subsidize remanufacturer for different service level.
5.2. Improve utilization rate of raw materials
When government subsidizes recycler, utilization rate of raw materials is increasing in subsidy
coefficient. In the view of sustainable development, the bigger the subsidy coefficient, the
higher the utilization rate of raw materials. When government subsidizes remanufacturer, there
is no influence of subsidy coefficient on utilization rate of raw materials which shows that
utilization rate of raw materials keep constant. Therefore, under the conditions in which
government can observe the information of raw material utility and remanufacturing service
level, if government want to improve utilization rate of raw materials, stimulate sustainable
development of industries of electronic product, it can subsidizes recycler based on different
utilization rate of raw materials.
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6. Conclusion
There are lots of studies on the effect of subsidy on the electronic products, but the most of
them only analyze the case of the constant subsidy rate of one remanufacturing product.
However, we research on decision-making on the closed-loop supply chain of electronic
products under government’s subsidy for the raw material and remanufacturing service level.
In order to compare the influence on different subsidy modes of closed-loop supply chain, we
bu i l d a Stackelberg model which contains an original manufacturer, a recycler and
remanufacturer. We solve the game model by optimization method. Considering the
equilibrium solutions are too complicated, we analyze the effects on different subsidy for
equilibrium utilization rate of raw materials, service level of new product and remanufactured
product and demand for them by numerical simulation. The results show that: (1) both two
subsidy modes can increase remanufactured product quantity and remanufacturing service
level; (2) both two subsidy modes have no effect on the manufacturing service level; (3) the
total demand could not be affected by subsidy to utilization rate of raw materials, but can be
influenced by subsidy to remanufacturing service level.
Our work involves three parties: original manufacturer, remanufacturer and recycler. In the
future, we can study the complete closed-loop supply chain including original manufacturer,
remanufacturer, retailer and recycler and analyze the effect of price, service competition with
various subsidies on decision-making in closed-loop supply chain. The product design also can
be considered when we analyzed influence of the product's dismantled ability on decision-
making.
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